

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:JHOGANSON

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P 181936Z APR 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

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FOLLOWING IS REPEAT AMMAN 2071, SENT SECSTATE APRIL 18:

QUOTE S E C R E T AMMAN 2071

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, US

SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCE PLANNING AND US ASSISTANCE

REF: AMMAN 2070

SUMMARY: IN CONNECTION WITH MY DISCUSSION (REFTEL) OF HAWK DEAL WITH KING, HE RAISED WITH ME, AS HE HAD WITH YOU AND THE PRESIDENT, THE WHOLE QUESTION OF FUTURE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND PLANNING FOR JORDAN ARMED FORCES. HE SAID THAT HE REGRETTEED WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE HAWK DEAL AND STILL HOPED IT COULD BE SALVAGED. KING WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH US IN DEPTH WHERE HE IS GOING FOR THE NEXT 3 TO 5 YEARS IN THE MILITARY AREA AND SEEKS SOME UNDERSTANDING OF LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE

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AND WHERE THIS WILL TAKE HIM. HE IS NOT AVERSE

BRINGING SAUDIS IN AND OTHERS TO HELP AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE. HE REFERRED TO TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND HIS IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CARRY THIS ON. OBVIOUSLY HAWK DEAL WILL AFFECT ANY SUCH COOPERATION. ASSUMING HAWK WORKS OUT, OPPORTUNITY FOR IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WOULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT OCCASION FOR US TO CARRY THROUGH WITH EARLIER PROPOSALS FOR MORE CAREFUL PLANNING BY JORDAN OF ITS MILITARY ACQUISITIONS, INCLUDING ITS CAPACITY TO ABSORB NEW WEAPONS IN LIGHT OF THE TRAINING REQUIRED TO USE SUCH WEAPONS. SUCH PLANNING WOULD ALSO HELP TO PUT A DAMPER ON AND PERHAPS EVEN END KING'S WILL-O-THE-WISP PERSONAL APPROACH TO WEAPONS ACQUISITION AND PLANNING. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS YOU APPRECIATED IN OUR WASHINGTON TALKS, IT WOULD INVOLVE GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF OUR COMMITMENT IN TERMS OF MILITARY AID AND BUDGET SUPPORT FOR THE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

1. AS I DEVELOPED FOR KING SOME OF THE POINTS IN REFTEL ON THE PRESENT AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM AND SAUDI FINANCING, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT AIR DEFENSE, BUT EVEN MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS LONGER RANGE CAPACITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF IN ALL AREAS. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ME EARLIER AND ALSO WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON HIS PLANS TO BUILD AN ADEQUATE AIR FORCE OF ABOUT 8 MODERN SQUADRONS (176 AIRCRAFT). HE ALSO TOLD ME HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE LOOMING COST PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED ARMORED VEHICLE REBUILD FACILITY AND THE FACT THAT MUCH OF JORDAN'S ARMORED FORCE WOULD BE OUT OF DATE IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS AN EVEN MORE OVERWHELMING PROBLEM FOR HIM THAN AIR DEFENSE. HE WANTED VERY MUCH TO TALK WITH US TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP HIM WITH THESE PROBLEMS. HE REPEATED AGAIN FOR ME, AS HE HAD IN THE PAST, HIS DESIRE THAT THESE TALKS FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS AND WHAT THE US COULD DO TO HELP HIM WITH HIS NEEDS IN THIS AREA. HE THEN RECALLED HIS HAVING RAISED THIS ISSUE IN THE MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE ALSO NOTED

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THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR HAVING WORKED OUT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS IN SPAIN AND TURKEY IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR BASES DEAL. I CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT THAT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE MEETING AND TOLD HIM I WOULD REPORT HIS CONCERN AND HIS APPROACH TO YOU RIGHT AWAY.

2. THE KING IS OBVIOUSLY AGAIN PREOCCUPIED WITH WEAPONS QUESTIONS AND ISSUES. WHILE HE TALKED IN TERMS OF THE FACT THAT EVEN IF HE WENT TO THE SIVIETS, HE WOULD HOPE TO CONTINUE A RELATIONSHIP WITH US, ALL OF OUR PAST CONVERSATIONS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM AS DID YOUR RECENT MESSAGE, THAT THERE MIGHT WELW BE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN OUR LONG-STANDING RELATIONSHIP. THEREFORE IT WOULD SEEM TO ME BEST TO HOLD OFF FOR A LITTLE WHILE IN RESPONDING TO THE KING'S INTEREST IN AND REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS LEADING TO SOME AGREEMENT ON HIS LONG-TERM MILITARY NEEDS AND OUR ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP. IN TIME, SHOULD PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES CONTINUE TO DRAG ON, WE MAY NEED AN INTERIM RESPONSE WHICH I SUGGEST THEN BE PHRASED IN AS POSITIVE TERMS AS POSSIBLE BUT WITHOUT A FIRM COMMITMENT ON ACTUALLY BEGINNING PROMPTLY TO WORK ON SUCH A PROPOSAL -- (AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER WE SEE HOW THE HAWK DEAL EVOLVES AND ITS EVENTUAL EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONSHIP.)

3. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE JORDANIANS TO THINK IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER ABOUT THEIR FUTURE NEEDS;

B. IT SHOULD LOGICALLY DEVELOP A PLAN WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL JORDANIAN CONSIDERATION OF THE FULL EFFECT ON THEIR ARMED FORCES OF THE ACQUISITION OF VARIOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS INCLUDING TRAINING PROGRAMS, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLY AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AND SO FORTH;

C. IF THE PLAN WAS ACHIEVED WITH KING'S COOPERATION AND WITH HIS BLESSING, WHICH I AM SURE WOULD HAPPEN, IT WOULD BE A VERY USEFUL BRAKE ON HIS INTRODUCTION OF  
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PERSONAL REQUESTS FOR UNEXPECTED AND UNFORESEEN ITEMS -- REQUESTS WHICH HAVE CONTINUED TO HARRASS HIS OWN PEOPLE AND RAISE A CERTAIL LEVEL OF HAVOC WITH OUR REGULAR PROGRAMS;

D. SUCH A PLAN MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE A MORE USEFUL BASIS FOR JORDANIAN SOLICITING CONTINUING AND PERHAPS EVEN INCREASED SUPPORT FROM ITS ARAB FRIENDS AND ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IF IT WERE KNOWN THAT THE APPROACH HAD RECEIVED US CONCURRENCE AND COOPERATION;

E. AND FINALLY IT WOULD INTRODUCE WITH US HELP FOR THE FIRST TIME A COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, A GOAL WE LONG SOUGHT FOR ITS DEFINITE ADVANTAGES NOTED ABOVE AS WELL AS FOR THE ADDED VALUE OF DEVELOPING SOME SYSTEM AND ORDER IN

JORDAN'S LONG RANGE THINKING ABOUT ITS MILITARY PROBLEMS.  
IT WOULD ALSO CORRESPOND TO SIMILAR EFFORTS BEING MADE  
CURRENTLY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE SOME DISADVANTAGES  
AS WELL:

A. COOPERATION IN THE PROCESS WOULD BEGIN TO  
RAISE PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT LEVELS OF US ASSISTANCE  
REQUIRED AND DISAPPOINTMENTS WHEN SUCH LEVELS FALL  
SHORT OF THE MARK. (HOWEVER THIS SEEMS TO BE IN  
PART OFFSET BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO TRY SUCH ARRANGE-  
MENTS WITH SPAIN AND TURKEY ALBEIT APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT  
OF AN AGREEMENT ON BASES.)

B. IT MIGHT RAISE FOR US SERIOUS CONGRESSIONAL  
CONSIDERATIONS (UNLESS SOME MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS  
WERE INCORPORATED IN THE PROCESS AT SOME POINT).  
THERE WOULD BE AIRLY DIFFICULT RESULTS IF THE US  
FALLS SHORT OF FUNDING OR IF ASSOCIATED ARAB STATES  
ALSO COULD NOT MEET TARGETS OR COMMITMENTS.

5. ON BALANCE I BELIEVE WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THE  
JORDANIANS IN WASHINGTON ENOUGH OF AN INITIAL POSITIVE  
REACTION TO MAKE IT HARD FOR US NOT TO CONTINUE THE  
PROCESS, AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF SEEING EXACTLY WHAT  
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THE KING HAS IN MIND. HOWEVER WE SHOULD MAKE ANY  
FURTHER STEPS UNTIL THERE IS SOME SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION  
OF THE CURRENT HAWK AIR DEFENSE FUNDING CRISIS.  
PICKERING UNQUOTE. ROBINSON

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMED FORCES, AIR DEFENSE, FINANCE, TOSEC, CAT-C, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, MISSILES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 APR 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ShawDG  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE094199  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** O:JHOGANSON  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** N760003-0327  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 2  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760448/aaaabpba.tel  
**Line Count:** 205  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** 76 AMMAN 2070  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 14 OCT 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** WITHDRAWN <17 JUN 2004 by izenbei0, 3.4.X6>; RELEASED <14 OCT 2004 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <04 NOV 2004 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** LOCK1  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** JORDANIAN FORCE PLANNING AND US ASSISTANCE  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MASS, MPOL, JO, US, SA, (HUSSEIN I)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006